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Introduction
The role of money in the implementation of
monetary policy has waxed and waned over the
past 30 years. Policymakers' attention to money
has been largely related to their confidence in
the stability of the relationship between meas-
ures of money and the ultimate objectives of
monetary policy, particularly the rate of inflation.
The link between inflation and money growth
has long been grounded in the quantity theory
of money. A key relationship in this link is the
demand for money. Indeed, in an influential re-
statement of the quantity theory, Milton Fried-
man (1966) argued that "the quantity theory is in
the first instance a theory of money demand."
Friedman's point was predicated on the empiri-
cal hypothesis that the demand for money is one
of the most stable relationships in the economy.
1
Despite some unexplained behavior in the mid-
1970s, the money demand function was widely
perceived as reasonably stable and reliable
through the balance of that decade."
• 1 Hendry and Ericsson (1990) provide some evidence that a con-
stant, conditional money demand model cannot be inverted to obtain a
constant model of prices for narrow measures ol money. We do not pur-
sue this issue.
The high-water mark for the role of money in
monetary policy was reached in the late 1970s,
when the Federal Reserve adopted a disinflation
strategy in which annual targets for monetary
growth played a key role. This strategy was
coupled with an operating procedure that auto-
matically reacted to deviations of money from
prespecified short-run paths. Although some
analysts criticized the procedure for not produc-
ing gradually slowing money growth, trend
money growth ultimately slowed, as did the in-
flation rate.
3 Moreover, money markets reacted
systematically to announced changes in the
money supply, providing evidence that the short-
run financial market implications of the proce-
dure were widely understood and anticipated.
In 1980, Congress passed legislation authoriz-
ing significant changes in U.S. banking regula-
tions, including the elimination of most interest-
rate restrictions. Many analysts believed that such
deregulation would enable depository institutions
to pay higher yields on deposits and thereby
• 2 For evidence on the breakdown of conventional money demand
models in the mid-1970s, see Goldfeld (1976) and Judd and Scadding
(1982).
• 3 To appreciate the difficulty in choosing prespecified monetary tar-
gets to reduce the inflation rate, see Poole (1988).claim a larger share of the household portfolio.
This, in turn, would affect the relationship be-
tween money measures (comprised largely of
deposits) and the level of economic activity.
Concerns about the impact of deregulation
on the stability of money demand appeared to
be warranted for the narrower money measures
such as Ml. The introduction of interest-bearing
checking nationwide and new deposit instru-
ments such as money market deposit accounts
(MMDAs) greatly affected long-established
depositor behavior. Common specifications for
Ml demand did not survive deregulation. And
while attempts have been made to rectify Ml
demand in the short run, no consensus has yet
emerged on any particular empirical form.
4
Research on M2 demand, however, has
yielded evidence of stable short-run specifica-
tions for this aggregate, at least in the post-World
War II period (see Moore, Porter, and Small
[1990], Hetzel and Mehra [1987], and Mehra
[1991]). But in 1989 and 1990, M2 grew more
slowly than these models had predicted. Two
hypotheses have been proposed to account for
this. The first is that at least part of the unex-
plained behavior is related to the mismeasure-
ment of the opportunity cost of M2. The second
is that the restructuring of the savings and loan
(thrift) industry has affected M2 growth.
This paper presents a specification of M2 de-
mand that adopts the general framework used
by Moore, Porter, and Small (hereafter referred
to as MPS), but uses an alternative measure of
opportunity cost. We attempt to capture the ef-
fects of thrift restructuring on the adjustment of
M2 to its equilibrium level. The estimated regres-
sion remains stable throughout the period of
deregulation, and the results suggest that the
model's performance can be improved by meas-
uring opportunity cost more precisely. Moreover,
our results are consistent with the hypothesis
that recent M2 weakness is partly related to the





Empirical aggregate money-demand functions
estimated in the postwar period typically include
some measure of the opportunity cost of holding
money (most often a short-term interest rate)
and a scale variable such as income or spending.
• 4 For a stable short-run specification ol M1 demand, see Hendry
and Ericsson (1990). For an examination of long-run M1 demand, see
Hoffman and Rasche (1989),
This research has generally found evidence of
inertia in the response of money demand to
changes in opportunity costs and spending.
Early postwar specifications attempted to cap-
ture this inertia as a partial-adjustment specifica-
tion. This approach was sometimes identified as
the conventional specification or the Goldfeld
equation (see Goldfeld [1973]). Alternatively, re-
searchers have handled the inertia by using a dis-
tributed lag (of either the levels or the first
differences of the levels) of the regressors.
MPS were among the first advocates of specify-
ing the inertia in an error-correction framework.
They noted two advantages to this approach.
First, error-correction regressors—entered as first
differences in the levels—are more likely to be sta-
tionary and are much less colinear than they
would be as undifferenced regressors. Second,
the long- and short-run money demand relation-
ships are clearly distinguished.
In addition, Hendry and Ericsson note that the
error-correction framework generalizes the con-
ventional partial-adjustment model in a way that
allows for separate rates of reaction to the vari-
ous determinants of money demand, reflecting
different costs of adjustment. They further argue
that the error-correction specification is related
to theories of money adjustment such as the
model developed by Miller and Orr (1966). In
these models, the short-run factors determine
money movements given desired bands, while
the long-run factors influence the levels of the
bands themselves.
We follow the approach of MPS, but specify
the long-run money demand function as
(1) mt = a + yt + [3s, + et,
where m, = log (M2), yl = log (nominal GNP),
and 5 = log (opportunity cost).
Note that the unitary coefficient on nominal
GNP ensures that this expression also specifies
a relationship in which long-run velocity varies
only with opportunity cost.
5 The second
component is a dynamic specification based on
an error-correction adjustment specification:





• 5 MPS include a time index as a regressor to estimate any drift in
M2 velocity directly. Although they find the coefficient to be significant,
the drift is negligible—about 0.03 percent per year (see appendix).where et _ 1 is the deviation of money from its
long-run equilibrium value (derived from equa-
tion [1]) and £t is white noise. Adjustment speed
is determined by changes in the lagged values of
M2 and in the current and lagged values of
opportunity cost and the scale variable. The gen-
eral form of the model allows other variables,
xit, to affect adjustment speed (both current and
lagged values). These variables, which need not
affect equilibrium money balances, include any
factors that influence the adjustment process.
Equation (2) essentially specifies the short-
run convergence process of M2 to its equilib-
rium value. When the coefficient on the error-
correction term is negative, convergence is








We estimate a version of equation (3).
II. Measuring
Opportunity Cost
By definition, the opportunity cost of money is
the forgone interest income from holding a mon-
etary asset in lieu of some higher-yielding non-
monetary, but otherwise comparable, asset. A
common practice in the money demand litera-
ture has been to measure opportunity cost using
a market yield on some short-term security, such
as a Treasury bill (T-bill) or commercial paper.
This seemed appropriate for the narrow money
measures during much of the postwar period,
because holders of currency and demand depos-
its did not receive explicit interest payments on
these instruments.
However, many instruments in the broader
monetary aggregates, such as M2, have yielded
explicit interest. During regulation, yields
responded at least partially to market conditions
when interest-rate ceilings were not exceeded.
In principle, the forgone interest for each of
these instruments is the difference between its
yield and the yield on some close substitute.
An innovation of MPS was to measure the
opportunity cost of M2 as the difference between
the rate paid on M2 deposits and the rate earned
on a T-bill. The rate paid on M2, or its own rate,
is a weighted average of the rates paid on M2
components (which include small time deposits,
MMDAs, other checkable deposits, passbook
savings accounts, and repurchase agreements
[RPs]), where the weights are equal to the corre-
sponding component's share of M2.
The three-month T-bill is generally considered
a close substitute for many M2 components
because, like most of these, it is of short maturity
and is relatively risk free. However, M2 compo-
nents vary in liquidity. Some deposits, such as
interest-bearing checking accounts, are available
on demand, while other components, such as
small time deposits, may not be accessible
without penalty for several years.
One hypothesis of this paper is that the
opportunity cost of M2 is more appropriately cal-
culated as a weighted average of the differences
between each M2 component and a market
instrument of comparable maturity. Such a meas-
ure would allow for the variation in M2 matur-
ities and hence would account for the interest
forgone by not holding more likely substitutes.
Unfortunately, data constraints make such a cal-
culation impossible before 1983.
Although it is not possible to match each M2
component perfectly with a market instrument of
equal maturity, one can achieve closer correspon-
dence between rates paid on these components
and on alternative assets than is realized by the
measure now employed. For example, a closer
approximation of the alternative asset rate can
be constructed using a weighted average of the
three-month T-bill rate and the three-year Treas-
ury note (T-note) rate. The weight for the three-
year T-note rate is the small time deposit share
of M2, and the weight for the three-month T-bill
rate is the non-small time deposit share of M2.
6
Some analysts have found that yield curve
steepness variables are statistically significant in
money demand models that use the conventional
opportunity cost measure. Using our measure of
opportunity cost, however, the yield curve vari-
able becomes insignificant. This suggests that
the M2 components' relative shares are impor-
tant in calculating opportunity cost.
• 6 It should be emphasized that this alternative measure is still an ap-
proximation. We are not matching maturities, since our measure of the own
rate uses the interest rate paid on the six-month certificate of deposit (CD)
as the rate paid on all time deposits. Nevertheless, the introduction of the
longer-term T-note rate into the calculation appears to improve the model.FIGURE 1
Change in Thrift Deposits,
1964-1990
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Over the past two years, many models of M2
demand have been consistently overpredicting
M2 growth. Some analysts have argued that the
unexplained weakness in this aggregate is
related to the ongoing restructuring of the sav-
ings and loan industry (see Furlong and Trehan
[1990]). As figure 1 shows, thrift deposits have
contracted significantly since 1988. Although
banks have acquired some of these funds, the
additional increase in bank deposits has only
partially offset the contraction at thrifts.
After the savings and loan industry's problems
became evident, these institutions came under
increasing regulatory pressure. Regulators no
longer allowed thrifts to bid for funds above mar-
ket interest rates. And the closure of thrifts, as
Furlong and Trehan argue, led to changes in
deposit pricing strategy for the entire deposit
market. To the extent that institutions paying
above-market rates were eventually closed, their
competitors were able to offer lower interest
rates because they no longer had to compete
against the insolvent thrifts. Furthermore, when
the insolvent thrifts were closed and their assets
sold to other financial institutions, many con-
tracts were abrogated. When the assets were
absorbed, the interest-rate "contracts" were
renegotiated. This meant that the above-market
interest rates offered by the thrifts were no
longer available.
As Furlong and Trehan note, interest rates on
MMDAs and on small time deposit accounts
have recently been lower than one would have
expected prior to the thrift industry restructuring.
This has caused an increase in the opportunity
cost of M2 and has led many depositors to trans-
fer their funds, at least temporarily, out of M2.
While the thrift restructuring hypothesis ex-
plains why deposit rates may be unusually low,
it is unclear why the money demand function is
overpredicting M2 growth. If deposit rates are
lower than expected, then opportunity cost
should be higher than expected, which in turn
should imply lower money demand. That is, the
weakness in M2 growth should be explained by
higher opportunity cost.
One hypothesis for the shortfall in money
demand is that the changed pricing behavior is
not captured completely by the measured oppor-
tunity cost. Although refining the opportunity
cost measure by partially accounting for the vari-
ation in rates across maturities does improve the
model, the measurement of the M2 own rate also
presents problems for our analysis. As noted pre-
viously, the own rate is computed as a weighted
average of the rates paid on various M2 deposits.
Surveys conducted by the Federal Reserve and
the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) ask re-
spondent depositories to indicate the "most com-
mon rate paid" on various types of deposits.
The aggregated own rate computed from
these surveys masks the shape of the interest-rate
distribution in two ways. First, if depositories pay
different rates on accounts of the same type, then
the Federal Reserve uses the rate paid on the
largest number of deposits to compute the own
rate. For example, depositories may have many
levels, or tiers, of MMDAs, each requiring a dif-
ferent minimum balance and paying a different
interest rate. Second, the distribution of rates
across depositories could be skewed if a few in-
stitutions pay much lower or much higher rates
than average.
Depositories that need funds are more likely to
be on the high end of the interest-rate distribution
and are therefore likely to be the institutions most
responsible for the growth of deposits. Unfortu-
nately, the own rate now used will drown out the
rates reported by banks paying the "fringe" rates;
that is, those banks having the greatest effect onFIGURE 2
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SOURCE: Simulations based on authors' model.
the demand for deposits by drawing funds from
outside the depository sector.
7
A key hypothesis of this paper is that the
change in thrift deposits is a proxy for deposit
pricing effects not captured by our measure of
opportunity cost. In other words, the effect of
thrift restructuring on M2 demand may be
viewed as another kind of measurement prob-
lem. Because deposit pricing has at times been
more aggressive at thrifts than at banks, thrift
deposit growth could incorporate information
about the skewness in the distribution of deposit
rates. The rates on the extreme end of the dis-
tribution might well account for a disproportion-
ate share of the change in thrift deposits. For
example, in the early to middle 1980s, some
thrifts expanded their market share of deposits
and other money market instruments by offer-
ing extremely attractive (and, more important,
unsustainable) rates.
Interest-rate skewness, while not sustainable
in the long run, might affect the adjustment of
M2 to its equilibrium level. To examine this
• 7 A second problem is that the Federal Reserve and the OTS neither
collect the same information on their surveys nor compute the aggregate
rate for M2 deposits in the same manner. The OTS computes an aggregate
rate for each type of deposit at thrift institutions. This is calculated by asking
for the "most common rate paid" on a given type of account and weighting
that rate by the total number of depositsat the entire institution, not by de-
posits in the given type of account. This method implicitly assumes that
every thrift has a similar distribution of deposits. The Federal Reserve, on
the other hand, weights its aggregate rates by the amount of deposits in the
given type of account—a more accurate method of computing weighted
averages. However, the own rate is calculated using both OTS and Federal
Reserve data.
hypothesis, we include both the lagged change
in thrift deposits and the lagged change in M2 in
the error-correction equation.
8 Because the
thrift variable is largely a component of M2, we
would not expect it to add anything to the re-
gression unless it includes information not con-




The regression estimated in this paper as an
alternative to the MPS equation is given by
(4) Vm, = -.053 - .009 s,_j
(4.44) (4.60)
- .138(«,_ ,->;,_,) + .245
(5.13) (3.08)








+ .Oil REGDUM + E,
(7.38)
Adj. R
2 = .74; est. period = 1964:IQ to 1986:IVQ,
where 5 is our alternative measure of opportu-
nity cost, c is personal consumption expendi-
tures, x is thrift deposits (including other
checkables, MMDAs, savings deposits, small and
large time deposits, and term RPs), and REGDUM
is a qualitative variable that equals zero in all
quarters except 1983:IQ, when it equals one.
1
0
Because thrift restructuring has been ongoing
since 1988, and because we seek to avoid high
influence points given the substantial changes
in the industry since that time, equation (4) is
estimated before the thrift crisis (1964:IQ to
1986:IVQ) and simulated through 1990. All para-
meters are significant at the 5 percent level or
better.
• 8 We also looked at the thrift share of the deposit market as a proxy
for deposit pricing effects. Although this variable enters significantly in
some models of money demand, it is not significant here.
• 9 An underlying assumption is that pricing strategies persist over
several quarters. This persistence is reflected in the strength (weakness)
of thrift deposit growth relative to M2 growth, and accounts for the unique
information when both variables are included in the regression.
• 10 Following the practice of MPS, we present results that approxi-
mate s using a first-order Taylor series expansion (Taylog) when the op-
portunity cost is less than 0.5. We also estimate the model using the
simple log of opportunity cost. While the simple measure improves the
in-sample fit, o Jt-of-sample simulations are less favorable. Nevertheless,
the usefulness of the Taylog transformation remains an open issue,
though beyond the scope of this study.FIGURE 3
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SOURCE: Simulations based on authors' and MPS's models.
Figure 2 illustrates that although the model
overpredicts M2 growth in 1989, the gap nar-
rows in 1990. When we extend the estimation
period through 1989:IVQ, the adjusted R
2 in-
creases further, to 0.77, and the out-of-sample
simulation errors become smaller (see figure 3).
The measure of opportunity cost discussed
above appears superior to the measure calcu-
lated by MPS, improving fit and out-of-sample
simulation performance.
1
1 Changes in the esti-
mates of the opportunity cost variable coeffi-
cients show that the choice of opportunity cost
measure is also important. When the alternative
rate is used, the coefficients for each of the
opportunity cost variables—the first difference,
the lagged difference, and the lagged level of
opportunity cost—increase in absolute value, in-
dicating that those variables explain a larger
share of the changes in M2.
The change in thrift deposits is also highly sig-
nificant, both before and after 1986. When this
variable is excluded from the model, out-of-
sample simulation errors cumulate substantially
after 1988. Moreover, the lagged thrift variable
clearly adds something that the lagged change in
M2 does not explain. This suggests that the thrift
variable is capturing potential effects related to
the thrift restructuring, and is consistent with the
hypothesis that our thrift variable is capturing
part of the skewness of the own-rate distribution.
Our equation compares favorably with that
of MPS (see appendix). Improvement in fit is
substantial, from 0.68 to 0.74, and as figure 4
indicates, the bias in the MPS model appears to
be widening. More important, the stability of our
model does not rely on the inclusion of numer-
ous qualitative variables. Indeed, we account
only for the temporary effect caused by the
watershed of regulatory changes that occurred
in 1983- To test for stability before and after
1983, we employ a Chow test and reject the
hypothesis that the parameters have changed.
Figure 5 compares the simulation residuals
for the two models when the sample periods
are extended through 1989:IVQ. Note that both
models improve. The 1990 errors are negligible
in the alternative model, while the MPS model
continues to underpredict M2 growth.
To assess the robustness of our thrift proxy,
we examine the stability of its coefficient as the
sample size is varied. Figure 6A illustrates the
estimated value of the sample (bounded by two
standard deviations) as the sample size is in-
creased by one quarter, beginning with 1985:IQ
• 11 We estimate the model without the thrift variable for the period
1964:IQ to 1986:IVQ. Although the in-sample fit is only marginally better
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SOURCE: Simulations based on authors' and MPS's models.
to 1989:1 VQ and moving backward in time. Al-
though the coefficient does vary to some extent,
it tends to stabilize as the sample is increased
and is never statistically insignificant.
To see how important the most recent expe-
rience is, we repeat this experiment with an ini-
tial sample period of 1982:IQ to 1986:IVQ (see
figure 6B). The results, while not as favorable,
illustrate the relative stability of the thrift factor
as a determinant of money demand. However,
our findings also suggest that the influence of
the recent data is relatively substantial.
Finally, figure 6C shows the value of the coef-
ficient for an initial estimation period of 1964:IQ
to 1968:IVQ, and for each quarter forward. The
coefficient begins to stabilize in the early to mid-
dle 1970s. This finding is consistent with the
hypothesis that the thrift deposit change may
proxy for deposit pricing skewness. Prior to this
time, deposit-rate competition for funds was
largely constrained by Regulation Q. In 1973,
however, regulators began to erode this con-
straint by introducing exempt deposit instru-





We investigate two hypotheses that may explain
the unexpected slowness in M2 growth. First, we
attempt to measure more accurately an ag-
gregate opportunity cost of M2. The results sug-
gest that some share of small time deposits is
more likely to be a substitute for instruments
with maturities of longer than three months.
Although the alternative measure is a caide
approximation of an "ideal" aggregate, it im-
proves the fit of the model substantially.
Second, we explore potential effects of the
change in thrift deposits on the adjustment of
money demand to its long-run equilibrium level.
Although the economic foundations of the latter
hypothesis may be unclear, our preliminary
analysis suggests that the inclusion of lagged
thrift deposit growth in the error-correction equa-
tion helps to account for the weakness in M2.
The thrift variable's statistical significance in esti-
mation periods predating the recent restructur-
ing is surprising and needs to be explained.
We are encouraged by the out-of-sample per-
formance of our model and believe that further
improvements can be made in the measurement
of opportunity cost. Our results are consistent
both with the hypothesis that thrift restructuring
has played a role in the recent weakness of M2
and with the belief that the restructuring will
have only a minimal effect on long-run velocity.
This study also highlights the difficulty that
policymakers face in choosing the appropriate
target for M2. Our findings suggest that desired
M2 growth should be conditioned on expecta-
tions concerning the continued effect of thrift
restructuring, as well as on future movements in
the term structure of interest rates. The analysis
does not address how to predict the behavior of




The MPS model, like the one described above, is
an error-correction model that assumes a long-
run velocity following a constant, but nonzero,
trend.
1
3 The regression and estimated coeffi-
cients are given in box 1 on page 10.
• 12 For an analysis of the competitive implications of this exempt
instrument, see Kane (1978).
• 13 Much of this discussion is based on Small and Porter (1989).FIGURE 6
Coefficient of the Thrift Variable
A. ESTIMATED FOR EACH PERIOD BACKWARD FROM
1985:IQ TO 1989:IVQ
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B. ESTIMATED FOR EACH PERIOD BACKWARD FROM
1982:IQ TO 1986:IVQ
1964 1968 1972 1976 1980
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MPS specify the long-run equilibrium money
demand function as
where mt = log (M2), y( = log (nominal GNP),
s = log (opportunity cost), and T= time. This
specification allows M2 velocity to drift over
time, although the estimated coefficient indi-
cates that this drift is negligible in the short run.
Since MMDA in the adjustment equation is
essentially an intercept shift variable, the statisti-
cal significance of its coefficient can be inter-
preted as a one-time downward shift in the M2
velocity trend.
In addition to imposing convergence of long-
run equilibrium through the error-correction
term, MPS also impose a short-run "convergence"
restriction that requires the sum of the coeffi-
cients of Vlog (M2t _1),Vlog (Consump!),
Vlog(Consumpt__,), and Vlog (Consumpt _ 2) to
equal one.
There are a number of other differences
between the MPS model and ours. Aside from
differences in the measurement of opportunity
cost, MPS include variables that are not em-
ployed in our new specification of money
demand, specifically, DUM83Q2,
V\og(Consumpt ;), V\og(Consumpt _ 2),
Time, VCCDUM, and MMDA. We tested the
restriction on the sum of the coefficients on
consumption and M2 variables, but since the
restriction was not statistically justifiable, we
did not impose it in our specification. In addi-
tion, the coefficients on MMDA and Time be-
came statistically insignificant under our
specification. Thus, our results are consistent
with the hypothesis that, in the long run, M2
velocity depends only on its opportunity cost.
While both models fit reasonably well during
the estimation period, the new specification
behaves better out of sample, yielding smaller
forecast errors. In addition, our model is less
reliant on hard-to-predict dummy variables
whose effects are unlikely to be permanent with
respect to the growth rate of M2.
SOURCE: Simulations based on authors' model.B 0 X 1
MPS Model and
Estimated Coefficients
V log(M2t) = -.076 + .508 Vlog(M2,_;) - .000077 Time
(5.55) (6.04) (-2.57)
- .010 Taylog (Opp, , ) - .185 [ log ( M2, x ) - log (GNP, , )]
(-6.25) (-5.60)
+ .288 Vlog (Consump.) + .120 Vlog (Consump. ,)
(3.89) (1.64)
+ .085 Vlog (Consump t_2) - .0089 VTaylog (Oppt) (1.37) (-5.56)
+ .0056 MMDA - .0103 VCCDUM
(2.43) (-2.86)
+ .0271 DUM83Q1 - .0075 DUM83Q2
(5.64) (-1.36)
Adj. R
2 = .68; estimation period = 1964:IQ to 1986:IIQ.
Taylog : The natural logarithm of values greater than 50 basis points and the linear approximation of
those values less than 50 basis points.
Time : Time trend, which increases by one each quarter.
Opp: Opportunity cost of M2.
Consump -. Personal consumption expenditure.
MMDA : Dummy variable used to denote the permanent shift in money growth resulting from the intro-
duction of money market deposit accounts. It takes the value zero before 1983:IQ and one there-
after.
CCDUM: Dummy variable to correct for credit controls in place in 1980:IIQ. It takes the value one in
1980:IIQ, zero otherwise.
DUM83QT. Dummy variable to correct for the short-run shock to M2 caused by deregulation, which led to
the introduction of MMDAs and negotiable order of withdrawal (NOW) accounts. It takes the
value one in 1983:IQ, zero otherwise.
DUM83Q2: Dummy variable to correct for the second quarter in which NOW accounts were allowed. It
takes the value one in 1983:IIQ, zero otherwise.
NOTE: 7*-statistics are in parentheses.References
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